Tuesday, August 01, 2006

Pet peeve #151: "U.S. won against British using guerilla tactics"

A commenter says below:

"What's especially interesting is how the American revolutionaries defeated the British in the 1770s. One of the most important aspects of that is that the Americans didn't fight "fair" according to British standards. They didn't line up in opposing lines and mow each other down with musket fire. Those dastardly Americans would camoflage themselves and hide behind trees, rock walls, and hills, and snipe away at the British."

Unfortunately, said commenter is basically repeating propaganda. The fact of the matter is that both Colonial and British forces used a variety of tactics to conduct their war, and skirmishing tactics such as used above were common on both sides of the aisle. The only halfway-effective guerilla warfare during the conflict occurred in the Carolinas when Colonel Francis Marion of the South Carolina militia used guerilla tactics to disrupt enemy communications, capture supplies, and free prisoners. However, he did not use those tactics in any attempt to stop Cornwallis's march. It would have been suicide.

To understand why this is so, you must first understand the limitations of the available weapons of the time. There were basically three types of weapons available:

  1. Fowling pieces. These were large-bore muzzle-loading shotguns, typically with a large funnel on the tip of the barrel to allow easily pouring the shot into the gun after you'd poured in the powder and wadding. They were fired off via a flintlock mechanism. They required a significant amount of black powder and shot, had a maximum range of perhaps 20 yards, and were not widely regarded as effective military weapons due to those issues.
  2. Rifles. These were muzzle-loading weapons where the bullet was pounded into the rifled lands via a hammer and a rod. The stereotypical rifle of the period was the "Pennsylvania Flintlock". This was designed as a large-game rifle rather than as a defensive weapon, and thus had several attributes that rendered it useless as anything other than a sniper rifle: it had no bayonet mount, it had an extremely low rate of fire (taking perhaps a full minute to reload between shots), and you could fire it perhaps a maximum of three times before the barrel became so fouled from black powder debris that you had to stop and spend several minutes cleaning the residue out of the barrel before you could resume firing. These limitations mean that it was used solely as a skirmishing weapon, where skirmishers would fire a shot then fall back to the main body of troops. There was only one battle in the American Revolution (Cowpens) where the skirmishers were important to the outcome, and that was mostly by accident and mostly because they appeared apparently out of nowhere and panicked the British into surrendering.
  3. Muskets. These were smoothbore weapons which could be swiftly loaded with ball ammunition. Downside: They were horribly inaccurate and short-ranged with a maximum effective range of perhaps 50 yards. The only tactics that made sense was to stand in ranks and mass your fire, in hopes that the sheer weight of lead flying at the enemy disrupted their lines before they could be amongst you with their bayonets.
The "queen of the battlefield" was the cannon. Cannon could fire a hundred yards or more with grapeshot that could decimate a company of attacking soldiers. Cannon had one vulnerability -- lack of maneuverabily which made them vulnerable to being rushed by the opponent between shots and captured. Still, American militia without cannon who faced British soldiers with cannon generally broke ranks and ran in the opposite direction.

Given the limitations of the weapons available at the time, the most important weapon of any military battle was the bayonet. Your enemy would get perhaps three shots at you in the time it took you to rush him with the bayonet. If you managed to keep a cohesive line, you could then generally throw him over with the force of your rush. The bayonet was also important in holding off calvary. Calvary was fast enough that you'd generally only get one shot at them before they were amongst you with your sabers... but if you held ranks and bristled with bayonets, the horses would shy away and allow your rear ranks to open fire on a now-stationary target.

Needless to say, all of this meant that almost all battles -- whether by the revolutionary army or by the British army -- were fought in conventional format, by soldiers fighting in ranks. The limitations of the weapons available simply made that the most effective way to fight. The notion of the American soldiers "hiding behind trees, rock walls, and hills, and sniping away at the British" applied mostly only to a single battle that was mostly just a skirmish -- Lexington and Concord -- and mostly was applicable only because the British commander in that instance had been overconfident and had sent an under-strength force without its usual company of skirmishers. If the British unit had been at full strength with their usual company of skirmishers, they would have slaughtered the colonials in much the same way they did in New York when the colonials attempted to use the same tactics there against the British landing, by using the hammer vs. anvil approach where the skirmishers fanned out in front of the main van of the force and killed the colonial skirmishers from behind or pinned down the colonial skirmishers until regulars could charge and skewer them with bayonets. All of this was tactics that the British (AND the colonials) had learned during the long war with the French and the Indian allies of the French, and was standard military doctrine regardless of which side you were on.

In the end, the weapons available to you dictate your tactics, and the weapons available during the American Revolution dictated that it would be fought by professional militaries maneuvering in ranks, even within wooded or high-cover areas. It was not until the widespread availability of AK-47 variants, RPG's, etc. that it became truly feasible for a guerilla army using so-called "unfair tactics" to take on an organized army in modern warfare. Civilian weapons simply lack the rate of fire and stopping power to be particularly useful against a 3rd-generation armored force in that sort of war.

-- Badtux the Military Penguin

8 comments:

  1. Ok, this is going to be a LONG one!

    > Pet peeve #151: "U.S. won against British using guerilla tactics"
    A commenter says below:

    >"What's especially interesting is how the American revolutionaries defeated the British in the 1770s. One of the most important aspects of that is that the Americans didn't fight "fair" according to British standards. They didn't line up in opposing lines and mow each other down with musket fire. Those dastardly Americans would camoflage themselves and hide behind trees, rock walls, and hills, and snipe away at the British."

    Yeah, I was that commentator...

    > Unfortunately, said commenter is basically repeating propaganda.

    Not necessarily true, although the truth is probably between our extreme view points.

    > The fact of the matter is that both Colonial and British forces used a variety of tactics to conduct their war, and skirmishing tactics such as used above were common on both sides of the aisle.

    Quite correct. However, in general, the British were typically better trained, better armed, and better supplied than the American revolutionaries. Quite a few of the colonials did not have uniforms, which made identification of the revolutionaries (versus loyal subjects) difficult. Thus, the British were somewhat constrained against using such sniping tactics. The British soldiers were almost exclusively uniformed, and made particularly easy targets to pick out among the general population for the revolutionaries.

    > The only halfway-effective guerilla warfare during the conflict occurred in the Carolinas when Colonel Francis Marion of the South Carolina militia used guerilla tactics to disrupt enemy communications, capture supplies, and free prisoners. However, he did not use those tactics in any attempt to stop Cornwallis's march. It would have been suicide.

    Definitely so. However, the same is the case in Iraq today. The insurgents don't dare line up and face the American army en-mass. They would be quickly slaughtered. The same was true of the Americans in the Revolutionary War in most cases. But, that doesn't mean that the British weren't harrassed by irregular forces, and suffered as a result.

    >To understand why this is so, you must first understand the limitations of the available weapons of the time. There were basically three types of weapons available:

    > 1. Fowling pieces. These were large-bore muzzle-loading shotguns, typically with a large funnel on the tip of the barrel to allow easily pouring the shot into the gun after you'd poured in the powder and wadding. They were fired off via a flintlock mechanism. They required a significant amount of black powder and shot, had a maximum range of perhaps 20 yards, and were not widely regarded as effective military weapons due to those issues.

    These were pretty poor weapons, although larger shot (think buckshot rather than birdshot) could inflict injuries in exceess of 20 yards. However, they would be extremely inaccurate, and there would be a low chance of getting a vital hit.

    > 2. Rifles. These were muzzle-loading weapons where the bullet was pounded into the rifled lands via a hammer and a rod. The stereotypical rifle of the period was the "Pennsylvania Flintlock". This was designed as a large-game rifle rather than as a defensive weapon, and thus had several attributes that rendered it useless as anything other than a sniper rifle: it had no bayonet mount, it had an extremely low rate of fire (taking perhaps a full minute to reload between shots), and you could fire it perhaps a maximum of three times before the barrel became so fouled from black powder debris that you had to stop and spend several minutes cleaning the residue out of the barrel before you could resume firing. These limitations mean that it was used solely as a skirmishing weapon, where skirmishers would fire a shot then fall back to the main body of troops. There was only one battle in the American Revolution (Cowpens) where the skirmishers were important to the outcome, and that was mostly by accident and mostly because they appeared apparently out of nowhere and panicked the British into surrendering.

    I don't know where you learned to shoot, but it would be a pretty poor rifleman who could only average a shot a minute from a muzzle loader. I shoot a .50 caliber cap and ball [1] rifle, and I could easily average two to three shots per minute, perhaps even more if I felt the need (and were willing to accept the danger). As for cleaning the debris, that does present a bit of a problem but the act of ramming the bullet in the barrel does perform a bit of self cleaning. Plus, it doesn't take but a few strokes with a brush to loosen most of the debris.

    [1] Yes, I recognize the difference between a flint-lock and a cap and ball, which was a later development.

    As for the appearance of skirmishers affecting the battle of Cowpens, that's one of the valid use of such skirmishers. When the enemy doesn't know how many skirmishers there are (because they're effectively concealed behind trees, rock walls, hills, etc.), then the wise commander has to consider very carefully whether he risks sending his troops in.

    The issue about bayonets is perhaps valid, although a decent sword could easily counter a bayonet.

    > 3. Muskets. These were smoothbore weapons which could be swiftly loaded with ball ammunition. Downside: They were horribly inaccurate and short-ranged with a maximum effective range of perhaps 50 yards. The only tactics that made sense was to stand in ranks and mass your fire, in hopes that the sheer weight of lead flying at the enemy disrupted their lines before they could be amongst you with their bayonets.

    Muskets were pretty worthless, since their volume of shot was typically less than that of shotguns (fowling pieces), yet their accuracy was little better.

    In any case, though, any hit was likely to be eventually fatal in that era. All of the guns of that era used soft Lead bullets which tended to shatter bones when they hit. Additionally, the lack of antibiotics meant that the chances of infection were extremely high from any wound, whether it was infliced via a gunshot or a saber cut.

    >The "queen of the battlefield" was the cannon. Cannon could fire a hundred yards or more with grapeshot that could decimate a company of attacking soldiers. Cannon had one vulnerability -- lack of maneuverabily which made them vulnerable to being rushed by the opponent between shots and captured. Still, American militia without cannon who faced British soldiers with cannon generally broke ranks and ran in the opposite direction.

    There's no argument from me about that. However, I have to wonder exactly how many American outfits had cannons? The Americans were primarily irregulars which were not adequately supplied, while the British had a quite effective supply chain.

    As for the limitations of cannon, that's one of the primary targets for calvary, which can mount a circular approach and attack the rear positioned cannons from the rear, either killing the crews, spiking the guns, or, ideally, using the guns on the enemy troops.

    >Given the limitations of the weapons available at the time, the most important weapon of any military battle was the bayonet.

    The bayonet was, without doubt, important, but I think you're over-estimating its importance.

    >Your enemy would get perhaps three shots at you in the time it took you to rush him with the bayonet.

    At least three volleys, which meant that evenly matched forces would suffer a signficant defeat to the side who charged prematurely, given that it's difficult to shoot accurately and reload while charging (while the other side was standing fixed and firing away, decimating your ranks). Additionally, if the charging side has to climb over any obsticles (fences, creeks, rock walls, etc.), then that gives the defenders even more time to volley away, decimating the charging side.

    >If you managed to keep a cohesive line, you could then generally throw him over with the force of your rush.

    Given that your forces hadn't been decimated by the volleys fired, nor that you have to clear any battlefield obsticles.

    > The bayonet was also important in holding off calvary.

    Only when the calvary was improperly used. The idea behind calvary was that they could circle behind the lines, drawing the enemy's attention, and allowing the main force to either have free volleys or to mount a bayonet charge. Calvary should never be used for one on one engagements of foot soldiers.

    >Calvary was fast enough that you'd generally only get one shot at them before they were amongst you with your sabers...

    And, it would have taken a fairly poor calvary commander to order a direct calvary charge into the lines. The idea behind calvary is to circle around the main lines, and attack from the rear, disrupting the chain of command, attacking the officers, destroying supplies, and ruining cannons.

    > but if you held ranks and bristled with bayonets, the horses would shy away and allow your rear ranks to open fire on a now-stationary target.

    If you wanted to squander your calvary needlessly.

    > Needless to say, all of this meant that almost all battles -- whether by the revolutionary army or by the British army -- were fought in conventional format, by soldiers fighting in ranks.

    There were quite a few such battles. However, given that the American revolutionaries were usually less well armed, and less well trained than the British, the outcome from such an even engagement would often favour the British. Thus, the American commanders would not choose to engage in such battles, when they could avoid them.

    >The limitations of the weapons available simply made that the most effective way to fight.

    To some extent, that's true. However, an intelligent commander uses his forces in the best possible way, given the resources he has available. Sometimes, that means a frontal assault. Often, it means withdrawing, and making the enemy chase you, expending their supplies, while being harrassed with small arms fire from the flanks.

    >The notion of the American soldiers "hiding behind trees, rock walls, and hills, and sniping away at the British" applied mostly only to a single battle that was mostly just a skirmish -- Lexington and Concord -- and mostly was applicable only because the British commander in that instance had been overconfident and had sent an under-strength force without its usual company of skirmishers.

    That's the basis for a successful war. You save your forces for the battles you can win, and you fight them in the manner that enables you to win.

    >If the British unit had been at full strength with their usual company of skirmishers, they would have slaughtered the colonials in much the same way they did in New York when the colonials attempted to use the same tactics there against the British landing, by using the hammer vs. anvil approach where the skirmishers fanned out in front of the main van of the force and killed the colonial skirmishers from behind or pinned down the colonial skirmishers until regulars could charge and skewer them with bayonets.

    Ah, yes, the pincers movement that was first developed by Hannibal during the battle of Cannae. There are times to use sniper attacks, and there are times to withdraw quietly. You definitely don't want to attack a main body with a sniper or two. However, such attacks can be quite reasonable on a small squad that is isolated from the main body.

    >All of this was tactics that the British (AND the colonials) had learned during the long war with the French and the Indian allies of the French, and was standard military doctrine regardless of which side you were on.

    But, the British tended to not use these tactics, since they weren't "civilized". Civilized battle, as "perfected" during the previous several hundred years of European wars, consisted of soldiers lining up in skirmish lines and blazing away at each other until one side decided that they had extracted enough of an advantage to allow them to perform a bayonet charge. Or, until the officers decided that it was going to be a draw, and retired to their residences. In that era, officers did not participate in the fight, and to consider the spilling of an officer's blood was virtually unheard of.

    >In the end, the weapons available to you dictate your tactics, and the weapons available during the American Revolution dictated that it would be fought by professional militaries maneuvering in ranks, even within wooded or high-cover areas.

    Definitely and decidedly not true.
    There was no such thing as a professional American military in that era. Most of the revolutionaries were farmers who would fight while they could, and then return to their farms to blend into the general population.

    The weapons used in the American revolution were not that different from the ones used in the War Between the States (1860s) [1]. There, the tactics dictated that screening was used, despite the fact that there were also some line against line charges.

    [1] With the possible exception of things such as the repeating rifle, which slightly increased the rate of fire.

    > It was not until the widespread availability of AK-47 variants, RPG's, etc. that it became truly feasible for a guerilla army using so-called "unfair tactics" to take on an organized army in modern warfare.

    Still not true. Remember that, during the American Revolution, soldiers were often garrisoned in houses of the colonists. This meant that they were separated from the body of the unit, and were not massed together continuously. Thus, there were certainly opportunities for snipers to pick off a single soldier, or a small squad.

    >Civilian weapons simply lack the rate of fire and stopping power to be particularly useful against a 3rd-generation armored force in that sort of war.

    Only when used in the wrong manner. If you want a more modern example, consider the case of Alvin York in World War I, where he used a bolt action rifle to take out numerous machine gun nests. Rate of fire has little to do with the effectiveness of a weapon. That has more to do with the training, talents, and skill of the user. To quote General George S. Patton, Jr, on the subject of the M1 rifle: "The greatest battle implement ever devised." (and, the M1 is definitely not an automatic weapon, despite being present in the same era).

    In summary, a vast number of battles during the American Revolution did take place on traditional battlefields with skirmish lines. But, there was also a significant sniping and harrassment activity conducted primarily against the British.

    >-- Badtux the Military Penguin

    Dave

    ReplyDelete
  2. To the notion that somehow the British shunned partisan tactics because they were somehow "chivalrous", one phrase to throw out at you: "Tarleton's Quarter." Colonel Tarleton being a British commander who was famed for indiscriminantly slaughtering colonial soldiers who wished to surrender. The main reason the British did not engage in partisan tactics was because they were an occupying force in a hostile land. Guerilla tactics only work if you are a defending force in an occupied land, and the British generals were not stupid -- just at the wrong end of a very long supply chain that had a bankrupt government (the English Crown) at the other end.

    The main reasons for the British loss in the colonies had nothing to do with their military tactics. Other than very rare occasions such as Saratoga or Cowpens, the British military mostly won their actions. The main reasons for the British loss are logistical and financial. The British soldiers in North America were at the wrong end of a very long and expensive supply chain, and the whole reason the British crown had been attempting to tax the colonies in the first place was because it was bankrupt, barely able to pay the interest on the massive debts that had been run up fighting the French and Spanish. In addition, England did not have the draft, thus the Crown was limited to volunteers. Since few volunteers wanted to fight for poor pay in an overseas war, they ended up having to pay large sums of money to itenerate German soldiers in order to field a military large enough to fight. The British Army, at the outbreak of hostilities, had a sum total of 36,000 soldiers -- i.e., it was *NOT* a large professional army as you mention. And half of those soldiers were in India, unavailable to fight in the American theater. General Howe requested a minimum of 50,000 soldiers to put down the revolution -- larger than the entire British Army. Recruiting an army large enough to fight in America was never fully accomplished -- the number of British troops on American soil peaked at around 69,000, including the garrisons in Florida and Canada -- and when a British army was destroyed, replacing it became impossible for the Crown near the end of the war, because it was no longer able to even meet the interest on the national debt with the cash flow available to the Crown and lenders cut it off.

    Furthermore, the vast majority of the Colonial soldiers used in the conflict were full-time professional soldiers, not militia. In fact, George Washington is on record for calling the militia "useless". The militia refused to drill so that they could maintain the close-order ranks needed to mass fire, and broke and ran after their first shot rather than reloading (since they refused to drill on reloading, and thus the motions of reloading while under fire were not second nature to them). The majority of the Colonial effort after the early days of the war in Massachusetts was professionally-trained soldiers augmented by militia skirmishers. It was understood that the militia skirmishers were literally a one-shot deal -- they'd fire their one shot, then run like hell for home.

    The militia skirmishers produced relatively few of the casualties. For example, at Cowpens, the professional soldiers resulted in over a hundred British casualties, while the militia skirmishers accounted for a total of nine (9) British casualties. And this was in a situation where the commander of the American troops had deliberately put the militia with a river at its back so that they couldn't easily run for home. Even then, the militia ran like hell after their first shot, as General Morgan expected and hoped for, and regrouped only once they got well behind the professional soldiers, at which point General Morgan got them to reload and put them out on the flank. Meanwhile the British soldiers, seeing the militia fleeing, broke ranks and pursued them. Then they ran into the line of professional soldiers, who similarly started retreating, but slowly, slowly... as the militia, now reloaded, came in from one flank and the calvalry came in from the other flank and trapped the British in a classic envelopment. Then the professionals turned around suddenly and gave the British a nasty case of lead poisoning, the militia started firing haphazardly from one side, the calvalry started firing from the other side, and the British panicked, ran all over, and the professionals charged them and put an end to them at bayonet point.

    But this was a case of General Morgan taking advantage of a weakness of the militia (the fact that they would break and run after they fired their first shot), rather than a case of the militia being militarily useful after the battles around Boston. All in all, the militia accomplished very little militarily other than preventing the British from easily foraging for food. Which in itself was an accomplishment, since this forced reliance upon those very long and expensive supply lines, but is hardly the heroic tale that you recount.

    Remember the professional soldier's axiom: Battles are won by tactics. Wars are won by logistics. As is true in Iraq, as is true in Lebanon, so, too, was true in the American Revolution. It took a professional army -- George Washington's Army, trained by the best French and German specialists that he could hire -- to tie up a large professional British army until the Crown literally bled to death from the expense. Furthermore, Washington's army was equipped with state-of-the-art military weapons from an early date, thanks to support from the French and the Spanish, surrepitous at first then later outright. If it had just been the militia, the war would have been over sometime in 1776, after Washington was forced to withdraw from New York City. Instead, Washington maintained a core of a professional army, and eventually said professional army grew competent enough to win the occasional battle against the British -- albeit outright victories were rare for Colonial forces. But, as with Hezballah, simply surviving was victory enough. Bleeding the occupier until he was forced to sue for peace was the goal, not victory on the battlefield.

    It is said that George Washington's primary order was "Retreat!", and that his army's principle method of fighting was to withdraw from the field. But that does not mean he was in charge of a guerilla army. His army was a tidy orderly army typical of the era, professionally trained, and every bit as well equipped as any British army that it ever went against, and it was his army, not the rag-tag guerillas of myth, that succeeded in forcing the British to maintain large garrisons and managed to eventually bleed the British crown to the point where they had to sue for peace.

    -Badtux the Military History Penguin

    ReplyDelete
  3. Oh, one last thing: there is a significant difference between a cap-and-ball rifle such as used at Gettysburg, and a flintlock rifle such as used as during the American Revolution. The flintlock rifle was very difficult to load because the bullet was literally hammered into the lands. The cap-and-ball rifle, on the other hand, uses an expanding-base bullet (the so-called "Minie' ball") and thus accomplishes the dual chores of expanding to fill the lands and cleaning the bore as it exits the barrel. The cap-and-ball rifle literally revolutionized warfare because it could be loaded as swiftly as the smoothbore musket but had a much longer range and much better accuracy, rendering entirely obsolete the tactice of mass assaults with fixed bayonets since the cap-and-ball rifle was effective to a range of 150 yards or more. Pickett's charge at Gettysburg is an example of an attack which would have succeeded if the two sides had been armed with Revolutionary war weapons, but which was an utter failure going against the new longer-ranged cap-and-ball rifles.

    - Badtux the Weapons Penguin

    ReplyDelete
  4. Very little to add Mr. Tux. Except to point out that another battle, periphrial to Saratoga where militia with rifles were important was at Bennington, under John Stark, they absolutely ruined a set of Hessian Jagrs (riflemen themselves) who were attempting to forage the countryside to help feed Burgoyne's increasingly hungry troops. This does nothing to detract from your understanding of things. Gen. Dan Morgan made his first appearance of the Revolution at Boston where he delivered Virginia Riflemen to Washington. His prior service to the British during the French and Indian war might well explain how he alone out of the field grade officers of the Revolution understood and used militia well.
    To the anonymous commenter: I own a .32 cal pennsylvania flintlock and must agree more with our penguin friend on the rate of fire. To load the long rifle one must measure the powder, pour it in, take the ball and lubricated patch (spit will serve but tends to disappear under fire) and begin with a stout (mine's metal and hickory wood, mostly metal though) starting ram and a hammer which will get the ball about 12" down the barrel, then the longer ram is used, which takes more than a few strokes. After all that, the pan must be primed. When you shoot a flintlock it is messy. The small channel between the pan and the barrel is one of the first areas that fouls, although unburned powder remaining in the barrel after multiple shots has resulted in many a misfire or worse.

    ReplyDelete
  5. A excellent analysis! Thank you.

    Now, the question is, how many of the situations that were present during the American Revolution are present (only reversed) in Iraq today?

    Dave

    ReplyDelete
  6. As far as the iraq situation being related in any way to the American Revolution, I must say nope, it's not even remotely the same. I see many closer parallels to Iraq in the Athenian expedition to Sicily during the Peloponessian war than I do to our Revolution. Oh, and according to Thucydides, the only true victor in the war between Athens and Sparta was Persia.

    ReplyDelete
  7. Wasn't it Von Stuben who trained the troops during their stay at Valley Forge? Up untill then they were the rag-tag army of America. Not until Monmouth, NJ battle did Washington's troops hold the line, and that was against about 2000 rear guard while the main body of the british troops who were getting out of philly were well on their way to the sea.
    We won because we changed the face of war. Don't forget that up untill that time officers were NOT targeted on both sides. It was always a Gentlemen's war. We on the other hand picked off the officers first. We changed the face of war. Just like the Hezbollah are changing the face of war right now.

    ReplyDelete
  8. Wonder if after a whole year I'm shooting at an already dead duck, but I guess there's something more about bayonets than just to have a proper "pole" to fix them - soldiers must also be properly trained, or at least somehow "introduced" to such a barbaric and ugly thing like edged weapons. From what I remember to have read about, not only Militia but also Continental Army troops often fleed when the redcoats came on them with cold steel - until von Steuben taugh them what to do, as Mike noted. And even so, they disliked so much the bayonet that often preferred to use their musket stocks as clubs. As a side note, back in the 1700s Frederick the Great had suppressed his own Jaeger and Light Foot battalions because they just didn't suit to his tactical doctrines, which depended on maneuvering and firepower.

    There appears to be something paradoxical about bayonet charges. They are usually performed (and successful) when only one of both sides is really minded about it. Since old Mausers were replaced by FALs, down here in Argentina bayonet training has become a non-issue on the grounds that (allegedly) there is no chance for a fray with armes blanches on a battlefield ruled by autos and assault rifles. The result was many an Argentine conscript stabbed to death with his magazine full of rounds and his finger on the trigger. It seems you must be trained on bayonet fighting just to avoid the other guy to scare you - then you keep your nerve and just shoot him dead. But even after the '82 debacle the facts remained stubbornly denied. Some 15 years ago, I and some officer brothers were regarded as a bit of excentric about our idea on resurrect tradition, and as a matter of fact we couldn't even find an old NCO to teach us the stuff (those who had had any experience were retired and often TOO old to be exposed to any sort of athletical demand).

    The bitter irony is that, hardly three generations before, knife fighting was an unfortunately usual way to settle down personal disputes - about politics, gambling or women as well - among Argentine popular classes! I was about to call them "working class", but if applied to 1900s compadritos that'd be blunt sarcasm.

    On the other hand, I'm afraid your figures for effective range are a bit low. Most of the literature I was acquainted with told about 100-150 yards for smoothbore musketry and at least trice that range for Minies, Enfields and Springfields, at least when firing on massed targets (I agree big game hunting and officer sniping should be another sort of business). In most Seven Years War engagements, the first volley was often fired at 100-150 yards, though the reply used to be delivered much closer and with much greater effect. Hence, the courtois invitations at Fontenay could have been just a dirty trick. Anyway, Fontenay was started at an unusually close range, so you must perhaps go to Hohenfriedberg or Rosbach for an average scenario.

    You must also take on account that cap locks are much more reliable than flintlocks, specially in rainy or humid weather, and that even before introduction of smokeless, XIXth Century chemists had greatly improved blackpowder. I can't tell about your Revolution, but by the 1810s Fray Luis Beltran (who was in charge of the Army of the Andes' Ordnance) recorded that it has to be expected at least one misfire in every five shots, even using the best flintstones available (Spanish ones enjoyed of better reputation than British and Swedish ones, but all them were a nuissance). As for target practice, this was performed against 5ft tall adobe walls at 80-100 yards - the idea appealingly being that damn lateral dispersion, it was enough to be sure that bullets didn't fly higher than a Royalist's head either hit the dirt in front of him. As well as the muskets were either Brown Bessies or Charlevilles, or their locally-made copies, I guess this picture can be somehow applied to the 1770s.

    Most writers agree that it was not rate of fire, but range (and hence, the deadly zone to be crossed) which turned infantry assault tactics obsolete during the 1860s. When asked how much had Napoleon's writtings influenced his professional career, General Grant replied: "The two greatest worries I had to face during the War were the delivery of troops and supplies by railroad, and the rifled musket shooting from behind a timber parapet. Napoleon never wrote a line about those."

    Just for the records and about your comment on Picket's Charge - my own sources (Curt Johnson's ARTILLERY, pages 20-24 - Octopus Book Lted., 1975 ) put the emphasis on case and canister from General Hunt's 80 guns placed at Cemetery Ridge better than bullets from Union infantrymen as the main cause of its failure. (Same source also points out that Hunt's batteries had been previously and unsuccessfully shelled by Col.Alexander's 159 guns, in an attempt to either silence them or force Union gunners to exhaust their ammunition in a long range duel before Picket's men left the woods.)

    ReplyDelete

Ground rules: Comments that consist solely of insults, fact-free talking points, are off-topic, or simply spam the same argument over and over will be deleted. The penguin is the only one allowed to be an ass here. All viewpoints, however, are welcomed, even if I disagree vehemently with you.

WARNING: You are entitled to create your own arguments, but you are NOT entitled to create your own facts. If you spew scientific denialism, or insist that the sky is purple, or otherwise insist that your made-up universe of pink unicorns and cotton candy trees is "real", well -- expect the banhammer.

Note: Only a member of this blog may post a comment.